Speaking at a forum hosted by the Center for American Progress on Tuesday, shortly after US President Donald Trump concluded his second visit to China in nine years, former US secretary of state Antony Blinken warned that the United States must rally allies into a broad coalition against China as it could not compete with China alone.

The irony was difficult to miss. Rather than reflecting on the failure of the policy he helped design, Blinken merely prescribed more of the same medicine: more alliance-building, more geopolitical mobilization and more zero-sum thinking.

That outlook is deeply rooted in the Cold War mentality that has long shaped sections of Washington’s foreign policy establishment. For many in that circle, the US’ triumph over the Soviet Union became not merely a historical episode but a permanent intellectual template. They continue to see international relations through the prism of ideological confrontation and strategic containment, believing any rising power must inevitably be treated as an adversary to be weakened and isolated.

However, the global economy is now profoundly interconnected and the challenges facing humanity — climate change, public health crises, energy security, technological governance and economic recovery — demand cooperation rather than bloc confrontation.

Despite the loud rhetoric about “small yard and high fences”, trade between China and the US under the Joe Biden administration, for which Blinken served as the top diplomat, remained sizable. What emerged was not “decoupling”, but selective restrictions in a handful of strategic sectors by the US alongside continued cooperation across much of the broader economy.

And even as Washington urged allies to reduce economic ties with China, it preserved its own extensive commercial relationship with the world’s second-largest economy — a contradiction that did not go unnoticed by US partners.

Blinken’s latest call for rebuilding the “united front” also conveniently overlooks the costs that US allies and partners were forced to bear under the previous administration’s ill-advised policies. Washington repeatedly demanded strategic alignment against China while pursuing economic measures that primarily benefited the US.

The Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act were promoted as pillars of industrial renewal, yet many US allies viewed them as unmistakably “America First” policies in new packaging. European governments openly criticized US subsidies and “Buy American” provisions that diverted investment away from Europe toward the US. Concerns spread from Paris to Berlin that Washington was effectively weaponizing economic policy against friends.

In other words, some allies increasingly felt they were being asked to provide the oil to keep the US’ engine running while absorbing the economic losses themselves. This exposes the inherent weakness of Blinken’s coalition logic. Partnerships cannot endure if they are built primarily around pressure, fear and asymmetric sacrifice, which the former US administration branded as a moral imperative. Nor can strategic stability emerge from attempts to divide the world into opposing camps.

The reality is that China is not an enemy. It is a major partner with which the US should learn to coexist. That is precisely why the new vision jointly advanced during Trump’s visit to China last week — of building a constructive bilateral relationship of strategic stability — deserves serious attention. It reflects valuable lessons drawn from decades of Sino-US engagement.

The “constructive strategic stability” is a positive stability with cooperation as the mainstay, a sound stability with moderate competition, a constant stability with manageable differences, and an enduring stability with promises of peace.

Those who still cling to outdated bloc politics should do their homework carefully. Until those like Blinken in Washington’s policy circle step out of their “comfort zone”, it will be difficult for US policymaking to shed the musty odor of the Cold War