The war on Iran may represent a decisive moment for the EU if it has the wisdom to seize it

The war launched by the United States and Israel on Iran has exposed Europe’s failure to fulfill its most basic responsibility: defending international law and protecting European interests. The economic consequences of the conflict could lead to a vastly different European Union — one in which member states reclaim control, and Brussels is weakened.

After the renewed US and Israeli aggression on Iran, most decision-makers in the EU quickly aligned themselves with Washington, largely limiting themselves to criticizing Iran’s military response rather than addressing the initial surprise escalation. The principle of self-defence, it seems, is applied selectively in Brussels.

In the face of this serious violation of international law, which resulted in heavy Iranian casualties, widespread devastation across the country, and further destabilization of the Middle East, only a handful of European leaders spoke in defence of the United Nations Charter. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez was among the few who openly named the aggressor and took concrete action, closing Spain’s airspace to any aircraft involved in the conflict and withdrawing the Spanish ambassador to Israel.

Europe has faced similar moments before. During the Iraq War in 2003, several European governments supported Washington’s illegal campaign despite widespread public opposition. The overthrow of the Libyan government in 2011 followed a similar dynamic, initially framed as a humanitarian mission but ultimately helping turn Africa’s most prosperous nation into a failed state, which is still struggling to recover 15 years later.

Then and now, nothing good ever came out of such military adventurism for Washington’s European allies. In addition to the tragic toll in military casualties and the waste of billions in taxpayer money, Europe was also confronted with skyrocketing energy prices, as well as millions of refugees who have placed significant strain on Europe’s social services, labor markets, education systems and local communities. But while the Iran conflict is not an isolated incident, its gravity and economic impact may surpass anything seen before.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fourth of global oil and one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas passes, will remain a source of instability even under a ceasefire. Shipping risks, higher insurance costs and damaged infrastructure will constrain supply for years. Key LNG facilities in the Gulf, including parts of Qatar’s Ras Laffan complex — the largest LNG terminal in the world — have suffered damage, with QatarEnergy’s CEO Saad Sherida al-Kaabi warning that this could affect LNG supplies to Europe “for up to five years”.

Europe’s vulnerability is compounded by its misguided energy policy since 2022, most notably the self-imposed sanctions on Russian gas. By cutting off a major and reliable supplier, the EU exposed its economies to wholly unnecessary risks, forcing reliance on expensive and unstable US and Middle Eastern LNG. The result is soaring energy costs, rising living expenses and a sharp erosion of industrial competitiveness. Energy-intensive sectors, from chemicals and steel to fertilizers and heavy manufacturing, are already under severe strain, with external competition growing and ongoing exposure to energy volatility threatening long-term decline.

The consequences are visible across key sectors. Germany’s chemical industry — long a backbone of European production — has been hit hard by soaring energy costs, with major producers such as BASF, Lanxess and Wacker Chemie raising prices and slowing investment. In 2025, investment in Europe’s chemical sector fell by over 80 percent, plant closures doubled, wiping out around 17 million tons of capacity and threatening roughly 20,000 jobs.

Even though the impact of the Iran crisis has not fully unfolded, industrial gas and electricity prices across the EU are already two to four times higher than in major trading partners, undermining competitiveness and making European factories less attractive than sites in the US or Asia. In France, energy-intensive sectors, such as chemicals, fertilizers, metallurgy, glass and plastics, report cost increases of up to 40 percent, with some struggling to maintain production.

In this sense, rising energy prices are not abstract statistics, but a force translating into factory closures and growing uncertainty for millions of workers and small businesses across the continent.

Consequently, Europe’s response to the Iran crisis should not be seen merely as inadequate geopolitical maneuvering; it raises a more fundamental question: Is European leadership prepared to prioritize the continent’s economic survival and long-term stability over Washington’s interests?

Many European citizens are skeptical of foreign military interventions and question whether European governments are acting in the continent’s own interests. This gap between Europe’s political elites and public sentiment is likely to continue widening in the coming years. As energy shortages and industrial decline intensify, this disconnect will evolve into a broader legitimacy crisis for European institutions and mainstream political leadership.

As a result, Europe is likely to witness the emergence of new political forces, alongside a gradual reorientation of mainstream parties. Pragmatism and the pursuit of national economic interests will increasingly challenge Europe’s automatic transatlantic alignment.

Such developments would reshape the balance of power within the EU. The current vision of a tightly integrated, uniformly aligned Europe would give way to a more flexible and pragmatic structure, in which EU member states reclaim meaningful control over foreign policy, energy strategy and economic partnerships. Integration would continue where it delivers clear advantages, but strategic decisions would increasingly reflect national priorities rather than come from Brussels. In practice, this shift would mark the rise of a more plural, multi-vector Europe, moving decisively away from the largely undemocratic, top-down model that has dominated EU governance for decades.

A multi-vector Europe would be better positioned to navigate a multipolar world. The EU could maintain relations with the US, but without automatically subordinating European interests or joining every US military venture. At the same time, Europe would be free to deepen economic and diplomatic ties with the Global South, including the BRICS nations, fostering cooperation that benefits both European citizens and the peoples of partner countries.

For now, Europe still possesses enormous strengths: advanced industry, technological expertise, a large internal market, a well-educated workforce, and world-class cultural and academic institutions. Decline is not inevitable. The continent can adapt to a changing global order and remain an important economic and political actor — but only if it develops the wisdom to defend its own interests.

In this sense, the Iran war may ultimately be remembered not only as yet another US aggression against a sovereign Middle Eastern state but also as a turning point in the EU’s strategic trajectory.

The author is a member of the European Parliament.

The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.